The state of onion services & PrivChat #5 [HTML]
Tor Browser 11 will end support for v2 onion services
As we announced last year, when Tor Browser 11 stable moves to Tor 0.4.6.x in October 2021, v2 onion addresses will be completely unreachable via Tor Browser.
If you are a Tor Browser user, you do not need to take any action, download any new software, or otherwise make changes to how you use Tor Browser. Once you upgrade to Tor Browser 11 stable, when you attempt to visit an onion site with a v2 onion address, you will see an error message. It is the responsibility of onion site administrators to upgrade their sites to the correct version of onion services.
Read more about the deprecation on our blog: https://blog.torproject.org/v2-deprecation-timeline
On the state of v3 onion services usage
Guest post by Tobias Höller
With the deprecation of v2 onion services right around the corner, it is a good time to talk about v3 onion services and their current adoption. Thanks to the privacy improvements of v3 onion services, they leak much less sensitive information when compared to v2 onion services. However, these changes do not completely stop the hidden service directory from revealing interesting metadata about their usage so far.
The results On the state of V3 onion services (by T. Hoeller, M. Roland, R. Mayrhofer) give a first good estimate on the total number of v3 onion services, and show that the number of deployed v3 onion services has been on the rise throughout 2021. So if you still operate only a v2 onion service, now would be a great time to get on board and upgrade to v3.
Read more the state of v3 onion services on our blog: https://blog.torproject.org/v3-onion-services-usage.
PrivChat #5: Protection against Pegasus
Every year, governments, law enforcement agencies, militaries, and corporations invest billions of dollars into building and buying malicious spyware--software designed to silently infiltrate a user's device and allow attackers to view the contents without detection.
This year, the Pegasus Project revealed that users of this kind of spyware, known as Pegasus and built by the NSO group, had targeted the phones that belong to thousands of people in more than 50 countries, including business executives, politicians, journalists, and human rights activists.
In the latest edition of PrivChat, Likhita and Etienne Maynier of Amnesty International and John Scott-Railton of Citizen Lab to discuss these issues with Roger Dingledine of the Tor Project.
Watch the recording of PrivChat 5: Protection against Pegasus on our YouTube channel: www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ovmcZtaacY.
What We're Reading
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